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The role of government accounting and taxation in the 
institutionalization of slavery in Brazil 
 
ABSTRACT 
We use a theoretical framework based on concepts of historical 
institutionalism, institutional logic and ideology to enhance understanding of 
how government accounting and taxation helped to institutionalize slavery in 
Brazil by interpreting enslaved people as an economic commodity. We conduct 
an interpretive critical analysis using archival sources from the period 1531 to 
1888. The social practice of government accounting and taxation produced and 
conveyed meaning using symbolic forms that ranged from everyday statements 
to complex texts and images. These codified financial realities in a way that 
reified slavery and influenced the historical trajectory of slavery. Government 
accounting and taxation practices were self-reinforcing sequences. They 
encouraged a structural inertia that was not conducive to de-reification of the 
slave trade or of slavery. We reveal how government accounting and taxation 
institutionalized government administration of slavery by according it social 
authority, social reality and temporal endurance.   
 
Keywords Accounting, Brazil, government, taxation, slavery, reification 
 
 
1. Introduction 
We analyse the history of slavery in Brazil from 1531 to 1888. Such a long analysis 
period yields instructive insights. Our objective is twofold: to reveal how the institution 
of slavery developed and was transformed through competing logics and ideology in a 
path dependent process; and to enhance understanding of how government accounting 
and taxation helped to institutionalize and reify slavery in Brazil. ‘Reify’ is taken to 
mean the subjugation and transformation of a person ‘into a commodity governed by 
“forces of the market”’ (Dallmayr, 1970; p. 127). 
The discourse in Brazil associated with government accounting and taxation 
established understandings through classifications and representations that were 
embodied in accounting records, scripts and schemas (Ezzamel, Robson, & Stapleton, 
2012). Such devices commodified enslaved people as forms of property and situated 
them in a market-based realm where they could be bought and sold with little constraint 
(May, 2006). Such commodification corresponded with State ideology and with the 
interests of slave owners and the ruling elite (most of whom proclaimed slaves to be a 
physical necessity).  
In comparison to other slave-based societies in the Americas, slavery endured in 
Brazil for a longer period (from about 1531 to 1888) and involved more slaves. An 
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estimated 4,009,400 African slaves disembarked in Brazil between 1531 and 1855 
(Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística, 2000). In the early decades of the 
nineteenth century, Great Britain applied strong pressure on Brazil to abolish the trade 
in slaves and slavery in all of its manifestations. This pressure had little practical effect. 
Between 1815 and 1888, de-reification was slowed by a structural inertia in government 
entities. This was facilitated by accounting and taxation rules that were embedded in 
Brazil’s institutional, legal and regulatory framework.  
We explore the logic and meaning of accounting in government action (Carmona, 
Ezzamel, & Gutiérrez, 1998) and how social practices, such as government accounting 
and taxation, were implicated in the re-production of organizational and social life 
(Englund, Gerdin, & Burns, 2011). Focusing on the texts of slavery that were associated 
with civil laws and government accounting and taxation enables us to highlight the 
logics responsible for reproducing the institution of slavery. To facilitate our analysis, 
we use an innovative theoretical framework which combines historical institutionalism 
(Steinmo, 2008; Thelen & Steinmo, 1992; Thelen, 1999), institutional logics (Thornton, 
2002; Thornton & Ocasio, 1999; 2008) and ideology (Thompson, 2013) to frame 
government accounting and taxation in the context of a slave-based society.  
Historical institutionalism is useful in the under-explored temporal and geographic 
context of Brazil because it provides a way of explaining ‘the processes of gradual 
institutional evolution … [and] the co-dependence of ideas, interests and institutions’ 
and emphasizes ‘the influence of institutional logics on social action’ (Schulze-Cleven 
& Weishaupt, 2015; p.71). Given the long analysis period here, historical 
institutionalism is an appropriate approach to adopt. By ‘historical institutionalism’ we 
mean a theoretical mind-set which considers institutional change as having been shaped 
over time by sequences of social, political and economic behaviours (Steinmo, 2008). 
Institutional logics analyse the relationships in social systems between individuals, 
institutions and organizations (Thornton & Ocasio, 2008). ‘Ideology’ is conceived as a 
symbolic substance that binds individuals to the social world and establishes relations of 
domination through the processes of legitimation, dissimulation, unification, 
fragmentation and reification (Thompson, 2013; Ferguson, Collins, Power, & 
Stevenson, 2009). 
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We draw on archival sources to analyse the role of government accounting and 
taxation in institutionalizing slavery.1 Our thesis is that government accounting and 
taxation constructed meaning and conveyed it by text and images to serve power 
relations in a slave-based society. We reveal how repetitive texts and images of 
government accounting and taxation were self-reinforcing sequences (defined later) 
supporting slavery; and how cognitive schemas reified slavery and its institutional 
logics. We discuss the reactive sequences (defined later) to slavery (such as external 
pressures from England) that reduced the institutional logic of African slavery. By 
explaining how accounting measurements were carriers of meaning (e.g., of rules and 
power) which helped to reify and institutionalize slavery, we reveal how the discourse 
of government accounting was mixed with the institutional logics of slavery. Through 
repetition this helped to shape cognition and render temporal endurance to slavery.  
This paper contributes to the literature on accounting and oppression by detailing 
the unique manner in which accounting and taxation were used to perpetuate the 
enslavement of human beings in Brazil over several centuries. Additionally, the 
innovative theoretical framework adopted gives needed attention ‘to the social-historical 
context of reception … [and] the meaning of messages as interpreted by recipients; and 
the discursive elaboration of messages’ (Ferguson, 2007; p. 928). Thus, this paper 
contributes not only to the accounting literature on slavery, but also to the broader 
accounting literature that emphasises the social and political nature of accounting. 
After presenting a literature review and outlining the theoretical framework, we 
discuss the competing logics at a first critical juncture: the decision in 1755 to prefer 
African slaves to indigenous slaves. Thereafter, we explore the competing logics that 
determined a second critical juncture: the decision in 1850 to formally prohibit the slave 
trade in favour of pursuing European immigration. We then explain the self-reinforcing 
discourses of accounting that encouraged structural inertia, draw conclusions, and enter 
suggestions for further research.   
 
2. Literature review  
Most research on accounting for slave labour has focused on slavery in the USA or 
British West Indies. Studies of accounting and slavery in Brazil are scarce. Analyses of 
                                                          
1 We do not endorse such institutionalization. Rather, we focus on critically interpreting the historical 
artefacts at hand. Our personal view is that  slavery,  in all of its manifestations, is  utterly repugnant and 
abhorrent. We urge readers  to be mindful of the ill-treatment and  human misery inflicted on enslaved 
persons and endured by them. 
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Brazilian documents relating to accounting and taxation practices have concluded that 
such practices were calculative recording and revenue raising mechanisms to facilitate 
the operation of Brazil’s slave-based society (Rodrigues, Craig, Schmidt, & Santos, 
2015).  
Previous research on accounting and slavery is of two broad types (Tyson, 
Fleischman, & Oldroyd., 2004). First, there are descriptions of specific accounting 
procedures associated with slave-related transactions. These portray accounting as a 
value-free calculative technology for monitoring performance and controlling costs 
(Razek, 1985; Cowton & O’Shaughnessy, 1991). Second, there are reviews and 
critiques (such as in the present paper) of accounting as a social mechanism for 
sustaining the economic and social degradation of slaves (Fleischman, Oldroyd, & 
Tyson, 2004; Fleischman & Tyson, 2004). Papers in this category include criticisms of 
historical examinations of slavery for concentrating on the technical side of accounting 
whilst largely ignoring the social role of accounting (Napier, 1989; Miller & Napier, 
1993). Some research emphasises the fact that although neither accounting nor 
accountants constructed slavery, accounting practices reinforced racially-based social 
relationships (Fleischman & Tyson, 2004). No prior authors have focused explicitly on 
the role of accounting in the institutionalization and deinstitutionalization of the slave 
trade and slavery, as we do here.  
Consistent with Miller and Napier (1993), Hopwood and Miller (1994) and Miller 
(1994), we view accounting as a part of society in which it influences, and is influenced 
by, the institutional environment. We add to the literature that has studied 
discrimination against African-Americans and the interrelation between accounting and 
racism. Fleischman & Tyson (2000), for example, found that in the Hawaiian sugar 
industry, different ethnic groups received different wages for performing the same task. 
Accounting was found to reinforce the policies of managerial elites and, in the absence 
of individual productivity data, relied on ethnicity as primary measuring calculus. 
Funnell (1998) argued that accounting was a powerful means for disguising the 
treatment of Jews during the Holocaust. He concluded that accounting relied on a 
network of euphemisms and disguises that promoted the eradication of the Jewish 
people. Funnell drew attention to the use of accounting having deeper social penetration 
than the events reported. In the same vein, Lippman and Wilson (2007) studied the role 
of accountants and accounting information in perpetrating the injustices experienced by 
concentration camp victims during the Holocaust. They showed how accounting 
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practices were implicated in the operation of slave labour and how accounting 
contributed to the genocide by disregarding the rights of Jews.  
The present paper is consistent with this vein of research. It seeks to highlight the 
role of accounting in the institutionalization of slavery in Brazil and reveal the political 
and value-laden nature of accounting. We draw attention to how government accounting 
and taxation in Brazil constituted an institutionalized government administration of 
slavery by according slavery social authority, social reality, and temporal endurance. 
Indeed, accounting provided symbolic meaning (through texts and images) to establish 
and sustain relations of domination. Much of our focus is applied to exploring how the 
institution of slavery was facilitated by accounting record-keeping, measurement and 
valuation practices over time, in Brazil. The macro-institutional approach (Arnold, 
2012) we use highlights how the economic institutions of government accounting and 
taxation helped to institutionalize slavery.  
 
3. Theoretical framework 
The blending of historical institutionalism, institutional logics and ideology enables 
exploration of how government accounting and taxation reified the institution of slavery 
in Brazil; and how it encouraged a structural inertia that was not conducive to de-
reification of the slave trade or of slavery. We reveal how accounting and taxation 
practices helped ‘ideas or haphazard modes of action gradually become embedded in 
social contexts and accepted as standard ways of acting upon reality’ (Hasselbladh & 
Kallinikos, 2000; p. 704). We show how the creation, alteration and reproduction of the 
institution of slavery was influenced by historically embedded discourses of 
government accounting and taxation (Barley & Tolbert, 1997).  
Our theoretical framework draws strongly on the idea that institutional logics are 
transformed through the deconstruction of an old logic and the construction of a new 
logic. Such transformation opens possibilities for a variety of changes in field-wide 
practices, as actors endeavour to construct a new, stable set of rules (Lounsbury, 2002).  
Historical institutionalism has emerged as a leading approach to institutional 
analysis (Peters, Pierre, & King, 2005) because of its capacity to explain politics and 
policy through its central argument that policies persist unless there is a strong force 
exerted for change. Historical institutionalism conceives public policy making and 
political change as a discrete process that is characterized by extended time periods of 
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considerable stability (referred to as ‘path dependency’). These periods of stability are 
interrupted by turbulent ‘formative moments’ (Peters et al., 2005; p. 1276) or critical 
junctures in which public policy is assigned new objectives, new priorities are 
established, and new political and administrative coalitions evolve to sustain those new 
policies (Steinmo, Thelen, & Longstreth, 1992).  
Path dependence is associated with two types of sequences in which events occur: 
self-reinforcing sequences and reactive sequences (Araujo & Harrison, 2002). 
Awareness of these two types of sequences helps in understanding the transformative 
processes that create new policy paths, together with the reproduction processes that 
reinforce existing policy paths. Self-reinforcing sequences are ‘characterized by the 
formation and long-term reproduction of a given institutional pattern’ (Mahoney, 2000; 
p. 508). They induce further movement in the same direction as policy. Thus, over time, 
reversing direction becomes difficult or impossible. Self-reinforcing sequences are 
characterized by positive feedback mechanisms (Araujo & Harrison, 2002; Mahoney, 
2000). They help individual agents to co-ordinate with other agents who take similar 
action. Thus, an increased prevalence of identical action reinforces agents’ beliefs in the 
action and encourages further prevalence. Reactive sequences are ‘a reaction to 
temporally antecedent events’ (Mahoney, 2000; p. 509). They are not characterized by 
positive feedback, but by powerful responses that shift the path of a system in a new 
policy direction.  
Historical institutionalists emphasize the contribution of historical institutionalism 
to understanding the ‘relationship between political actors as objects and agents of 
history’ (Steinmo et al., 1992; p. 2). In historical institutionalism, periods of 
institutional genesis (or critical junctures) are characterized by the adoption of a 
particular institutional arrangement from among two or more alternatives (Mahoney, 
2000; Thelen, 1999). Historical institutionalists consider these junctures ‘critical’ 
because once a particular option is selected it becomes progressively more difficult to 
return to the initial point when multiple alternatives were still available.  
However, historical institutionalism cannot stand alone as an approach to 
understanding change and continuity in politics and policy (Peters et al., 2005). For 
example, it should not be invoked solely to explain the genesis of an institution, such as 
black African slavery in Brazil. It is important to acknowledge that without including 
some dynamic concept of agency and a greater role for political conflict, historical 
institutionalism cannot provide an adequate explanation for change (Peters et al., 2005). 
7 
 
A program that has become institutionalized can be difficult to change because people 
working with that program will tend to defend the ideas and logic sustaining it against 
counter claims.  
We use the idea of institutional logics as a dynamic concept of agency – one that 
provides a greater role for political conflict. In doing so, we develop understanding of 
historical institutionalism by giving attention to political conflict and the dynamic 
relationship between institutions. Thus, explanations for the different responses of the 
Portuguese and Brazilian governments in respect of slavery need to consider the 
institutional logics at work. They need to go beyond the instrumentalism that regards 
individuals as making decisions solely for strategically self-serving purposes 
(Lounsbury, 2008). To assist in this regard, we study a long historical period to analyze 
how meaning is constructed and conveyed by symbolic forms, such as complex 
government accounting texts and images. We highlight how institutional logics are 
established to solve political conflict.  
Ideology and institutional logics have a crucial influence on the selection of policy 
options. However, to effect political change they must be articulated and injected into 
the political debate by agents who offer explanations or logics for policy change. Thus, 
black African slavery had logics that were ‘socially constructed, historical patterns of 
material practices, assumptions, values, beliefs and rules by which individuals produce 
and reproduce their material subsistence, organize time and space, and provide meaning 
to their social reality’ (Thornton & Ocasio, 1999; p. 804). While individual and 
organizational actors often seek power, status and economic advantage, the means and 
ends of their interests and agency are enabled and constrained by prevailing institutional 
logics (Sewell, 1992). This is known as embedded agency (Seo & Creed, 2002; 
Battilana, 2006; Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006).  
Ideology involves the use of symbolic forms to sustain relations of power and 
aspects of social life. Ideology can be viewed as the interplay of meaning and power 
(Thompson, 2013). To understand ideology, we need to investigate the social contexts 
within which symbolic forms are employed and how the meaning mobilized by 
symbolic forms establishes relations of power. As with Thompson (2013), we reject the 
idea that ideology is a social cement that operates only by unification and reification. 
Rather, we regard ideology as operating through five processes: legitimation, 
dissimulation, unification, fragmentation, and reification (Ferguson et al., 2009).  
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By combining the concepts of historical institutionalism, institutional logics and 
ideology, we show that the path transformation of Brazilian slavery was shaped by self-
reinforcing and reactive sequences (Mahoney, 2000). These were responses to the 
diffusion of competing institutional logics by symbolic forms (texts and images) which 
circulated in the social world to bind individuals to the social order. Government 
accounting was a language which provided symbolic meaning to help establish and 
sustain relations of domination by slave owners, reify slavery, and shape the historical 
trajectory of slavery. Government accounting and taxation provided self-reinforcing 
sequences and rationales for action that encouraged agents to persist with slavery and 
develop it further.  
We argue that government accounting is a specialised form of codified discourse 
which is reliant primarily on numerical representations (Llewellyn & Milne, 2007). 
Government accounting, as a language, articulates ideas by providing scripts and 
images that help to institutionalize meaning. Codification provided by accounting ‘fixes 
financial realities’ (Llewellyn & Milne, 2007; p. 806). Thus, government accounting 
discourses should not be treated in isolation, but together with the social-historical 
contexts of their production, transmission and reception (Ferguson, 2007).  
Consistent with Thompson (1990), we believe that to understand the meaning of 
symbolic forms, or to interpret their significance, analysts must consider what these 
forms mean to actors who encounter them. The historically-specific and socially-
structured contexts in which symbolic forms2 are produced, transmitted and received 
should not be neglected. That is, we should not neglect the relations of power, the 
relevant institutions, available resources, and forms of authority (Ferguson, 2007). Such 
an approach will help understand how practical knowledge is inculcated gradually and 
reproduced continuously, in the mundane activities of everyday life (Thompson, 2013). 
It will also help in understanding how the accounting message is produced as 
‘meaningful symbolic construction’ (Thompson, 1995; p. 305) to serve the interests of 
particular actors (slave owners) to the detriment of others (slaves).  
 
4. Research method 
                                                          
2 Thompson (1990; p. 59) uses the term ‘symbolic forms’ to refer to a ‘broad range of actions and 
utterances, images and texts, which are produced by subjects and recognised by them and others as 
meaningful constructs.’ 
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We combine primary and secondary sources to help understand how the institution 
of slavery developed and transformed; and how government accounting and taxation 
was implicated in institutionalizing slavery. Table 1 describes the main sources of 
evidence used. Data were coded by the first author using a coding scheme developed 
during the reading of documents. A conceptual matrix based on the theoretical 
framework was prepared to summarize the main themes. Relationships between themes 
were established through re-reading data and matching those data with documentary 
information collected. The main themes and the main sources are presented in Table 1. 
-------------------------------------- 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
-------------------------------------- 
 
Primary sources are those produced by participants in, or contemporary observers 
of, the events under investigation. Secondary sources are the interpretations produced 
by other than contemporary participants in historical events. As Table 1 evidences, 
primary and secondary sources are used in combination. Many of the primary sources 
(such as relevant legislation) are available online. All cited legislation related to slavery 
in the analysis period (all in the Portuguese language) was read by the first author.  
We investigated the relationship between accounting and the social system in Brazil 
in order to critically evaluate the role of government accounting and taxation in 
facilitating slavery. Following the call by Dillard (1991), we use a critical perspective to 
try to understand how accounting helped to reify and perpetuate an oppressive social 
and economic system: that is, how material, ideological and institutional processes 
imposed a system which led to the exploitation of enslaved persons by slave owners and 
the State. By promoting this understanding, we aim to assist efforts to change these 
processes and practices and the profession (Laughlin, 1999). 
 
5. Competing logics and the first critical juncture: Opting for African 
slavery  
In the latter half of the sixteenth century, the Brazilian captaincies (later provinces) 
of Pernambuco, Bahia and Rio de Janeiro became the first slave-based sugar plantation 
societies in the Americas (Hawthorne, 2010). The near impossibility of acquiring free 
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labour from Europe led to the belief by the Portuguese King and his advisors that there 
were no viable alternative sources of labour to produce sugar, other than slaves 
(Bergard, 2007). The labour-intensive nature of this industry provided a strong incentive 
to maintain slavery (Mattoso, 1986). Gradually, extensive use of slave labour extended 
from sugar plantations to cotton, rice and coffee plantations; and then to gold mines 
(Baranov, 2000; Klein, 1971). Legislation banning indigenous slavery was enacted as 
early as 1570. However, colonists refused to accept this legislation because there was a 
considerable undersupply3 of indigenous labour and the alternative source of labour 
(black African slaves) was expensive. Because of pressures to find additional labour, the 
Portuguese government issued regulations permitting the enslavement of indigenous 
Brazilians. Although these regulations were relaxed on 17 October 1653, they were so 
wide it was impossible for an indigenous person to not be considered a slave (Malheiro, 
1866).  
The introduction of black African slaves to Brazil arose from an agreement between 
Jesuits and Portuguese colonists to solve the labour shortage. Father António Vieira, a 
Jesuit priest and confidant of the King, favoured African slaves over indigenous slaves 
because he believed that they had the soul of white people (Hawthorne, 2010). In 1682, 
this led to the Portuguese king, D. Pedro II, creating a monopolist company, 
Commercial Company of Maranhão, to transport 1,000 black African slaves per year to 
Brazil for 20 years (Moura, 2004). This decision did not appease the colonists because 
an indigenous slave was much cheaper than an imported slave (30,000 réis as opposed 
to 100,000 réis) (Moura, 2004). Thus, the interests of colonists contradicted those of the 
government and Jesuits. The ensuing tense situation led to the Beckman Rebellion4 in 
1684 and the winding-up of the company in 1685. 
Institutional logics were contradictory. Although all laws issued by the Portuguese 
Government forbade indigenous slavery, in 1744, the governor of Brazil (Branco) 
complained that a lack of slaves was causing great poverty. He ordered slave-taking 
raids on indigenous populations (Hawthorne, 2010). In 1755, ‘after the generalized 
                                                          
3 The undersupply of indigenous work resulted of: the decrease of indigenous population (as a 
consequence of diseases transmitted by contact with foreigners, see footnote 5); the need to develop 
sugar industry; and the refusal of indigenous people to leave their traditional lives of hunting and 
fishing. To avoid slavery, indigenous fled to the backlands (Malheiro, 1886).  
4 In 1684, Manoel Beckman, a trader and farmer in Maranhão in North East Brazil, and his brother 
Thomas, rebelled against Portuguese colonial authorities because of the company’s monopoly and the 
high price of slaves. Manoel Beckman was executed in November 1686. 
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failure of indigenous slavery to provide a stable work force’ (Bergard, 2007; p. 152), the 
Portuguese government adopted a policy of allowing only black African slaves to be 
used to develop Brazil economically. (The immediate background to this important 
policy decision is outlined in the following paragraphs). This decision was based on the 
idea that the economic development of Brazil and its desired level of population, would 
best be achieved by importing slaves from Africa.5 Thus, contradictions between the old 
and new logics provided multiple sources of rationality and encouraged agency 
(Thornton & Ocasio, 2008).  
D. José I (who ascended the throne of Portugal in 1750) centralized the government 
of the Portuguese Empire in Lisbon under the Chief Ministership of the Marquis of 
Pombal. In his reform of Brazil’s financial administration, Pombal required the 
Governors of Brazil’s eleven captaincies to write official despatches to Lisbon about 
political, commercial, military and financial conditions. In one such despatch (dated 21 
November 1751), Furtado, the Governor of Grão-Pará and Maranhão, highlighted the 
need to address the economic viability of his captaincy. He argued that agriculture and 
mining needed a more resilient and dependable workforce than was provided by 
indigenous slaves (Rodrigues, Ricardino, & Martins, 2009).  
D. José I believed that large numbers of black African slaves would foster Brazil’s 
economic development. He prohibited the on-selling of slaves beyond Brazil, 
introduced a consignment note to control the slave trade, and imposed heavy penalties 
on convicted smugglers (Charter, 14 October 1751). Nonetheless, contraband trading in 
slaves continued. 
Governor Furtado was concerned about the limited supply of slaves to work in 
agriculture. On 24 January 1754, he proposed a solution to ‘... repair the sad destruction 
to which [the two captaincies of Maranhão and Grão Pará] have been reduced’ 
(Mendonça, 1982; p. 35). He requested that the King establish a General Company of 
Commerce to introduce ‘such a quantity of blacks [African slaves] into this State that 
the owners of sugar mills and other farms would find a market ready for them, where 
they could buy them for an adequate price and thus recover the extreme ruin they are in’ 
(Mendonça, 1982; p. 35). 
                                                          
5 The IBGE estimates Brazil’s population was about two million in the early sixteenth century 
(http://brasil500anos.ibge.gov.br/territorio-brasileiro-e-povoamento/historia-indigena/os-numeros-da-
populacao-indigena.html). The population decreased quickly as a consequence of diseases transmitted by 
contact with foreigners, increasing the need to import African slaves (Fausto, 1996). 
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To understand the ensuing policy change from an historical institutional perspective 
requires considering the actors, ideas, fragmentation and institutional logics that 
influenced the change. Furtado’s despatch was the action of a new Governor with a 
different background, interpretive framework, social definitions and beliefs. He argued 
that black slavery would lead to a better Brazilian society (Dacin, Goodstein, & Scott, 
2002). The problems Furtado perceived with the performance of indigenous slaves 
applied functional pressure (Oliver, 1992) for the de-institutionalization of indigenous 
slavery. Furtado’s despatches prompted political pressures that encouraged the 
Portuguese government to question the legitimacy of indigenous slavery. Thus, one can 
observe ‘the failings of existing norms and practices [indigenous slavery] and the 
legitimation of new norms and practices [African slavery] in terms of moral or 
pragmatic considerations’ (Dacin et al., 2002; p. 48).  
 
5.1 Policy choice: Indigenous slavery or African slavery  
In 1750, when the Portuguese government led by Pombal sought to develop Brazil, 
a policy choice was available between indigenous [native Brazilian] slaves or black 
African slaves. The selection of African slaves at the critical juncture in 1755 (Figure 1, 
Time 2) arose from a series of incremental steps that led to path transformation (Djelic 
& Quack, 2007).  
The principal source of change in institutional logic was that individuals and the 
State had learnt that indigenous slavery would not solve Brazil’s population and 
development objectives; and that African slavery had proved highly beneficial in 
developing other parts of the Portuguese Empire (such as São Tomé and the Azores) 
(Bergard, 2007; p. 152).  
-------------------------------------- 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
-------------------------------------- 
Usually, any specific program of institutionalization is difficult to change, since 
‘deeply entrenched clientele and bureaucratic interests’ committed to such a program 
naturally defend it against counter-claims (Peters et al., 2005; p. 1276). The passage 
from Time 1 to Time 2 (Figure 1) was determined by the prevalence of societal-level 
logics and the power of the State.  
The Portuguese Government was influenced by Furtado’s despatches and his 
exposition of the problems of pre-existing institutional practices. This helped to justify 
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the diffusion of new practices and ideology. On 6 June 1755, the government rescinded 
laws allowing indigenous slavery. The rationale of D. José I was that the Church and 
previous kings had decided indigenous slaves should be free. The interests, identities, 
values and assumptions of individuals and organizations began to be embedded as the 
prevailing institutional logic. 
After the new policy option was selected, it was reproduced stably in the future 
(Time 3+): that is, there was a path dependent process. Once this particular course of 
action was taken it ‘create[d] ongoing incentives and opportunities [to] further, or 
further undermine, the efficacy of state institutions over time’ (Kurtz, 2009; p. 481). As 
discussed below, black African slavery became difficult to abolish due to the influence 
of several reinforcing sequences of symbolic meaning (including those provided by 
government accounting and taxation).  
 
5.2 Self-reinforcing sequences: Civil law and the institutionalization of African slave 
labour  
On the same day D. José I rescinded laws allowing indigenous slavery, he 
established the General Company of Grão Pará and Maranhão. This was prompted by a 
petition of residents of Grão Para and Maranhão, who ‘…knowing the problem related 
to the lack of black [African] slaves in the region asked to create a company’ (para 30, 
CGPM Statutes) (Rodrigues et al., 2009). In 1759, D. José I formed a similar company, 
General Company of Pernambuco and Paraíba (Carreira, 1983). These two chartered 
companies were given monopoly rights to import African slaves for twenty years. The 
companies were intended to provide Brazil with a more pliant, qualified workforce. 
They were empowered to consult the monarch.6 Consultation was a self-reinforcing 
mechanism to entrench the public-private nature of the partnership between each 
company and the State (Rodrigues & Sangster, 2012).  
Between 1750 and 1787, the two companies transported an average of 1124 slaves 
per annum to Grão Pará and Maranhão (Hawthorne, 2010). However, between 1788 
(when their monopoly rights expired) and 1800, the average annual number of African 
slaves transported increased considerably to 1531 per annum (Hawthorne, 2010). Such 
                                                          
6 One such consultation lobbied (successfully) that slaves should be sold on credit rather than cash 
because ‘if it was a cash sale, only a few slaves would be sold, and consequently there would be a 
reduced workforce for agriculture which would damage the State [of Grão Pará and Maranhão]’ (Charter, 
9 June 1761; p. 800).  
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an increase is consistent with argument that transmission of highly institutionalized acts 
is sufficient for those same acts to be maintained (Zucker, 1977). The prevailing 
institutional logic prompted several government measures to prevent imported African 
slaves leaving Brazil. For example, a Charter of 19 September 1761 prohibited the 
transport of African slaves to Lisbon. 
In 1808, the invasion of Portugal by Napoleonic troops caused the Prince Regent 
(Prince João)7 and the Portuguese Royal Court to re-locate from Lisbon to Rio de 
Janeiro, from where the Portuguese Empire was governed. This led to several changes 
in the government of Brazil and in the provision of public services (principally by the 
Royal Treasury) (Rodrigues & Sangster, 2013).  
On 24 November 1813, Prince João signed a charter regulating the operation of 
ships carrying slaves from Africa to Brazil. Consistent with the need to legitimate the 
ideology of black slavery, this charter stated that African slaves were necessary to 
develop the vast expanse of Brazil to ‘open communication by land and by river 
between the capital and the different captaincies; increase agriculture, hemp plantations, 
spices and other foodstuffs...; establish factories ...; [and] extract mineral and vegetable 
products...’ (p. 49). Nonetheless, Prince João was mindful of international (mainly 
British) diplomatic pressures to abolish the slave trade. He expressed concern about the 
‘abominable slave trade’ which ‘his feelings of humanity and charity could not tolerate’ 
(p. 50) and about the harsh treatment of African slaves during their transportation. That 
is, ideology was operated by dissimulation through ‘euphemization’ to describe social 
relations in a way that elicited positive connotations (Ferguson et. al., 2009).  
These concerns should be understood in the context of external pressures by Great 
Britain to abolish the slave trade, which it did in 1807. Great Britain acted using moral 
arguments (‘the slave trade was evil’), but it was motivated strongly too by a keenness 
to protect its economic interests (by maintaining the cost competitiveness of British 
goods) (Bethell, 1965). 
In 1813, British warships captured several Portuguese slave-trading ships. This led 
to an increase in slave prices. On 21 January 1815, at the Congress of Vienna, Portugal 
agreed to ban slave trading in the northern hemisphere in return for indemnities of 
£300,000 from Great Britain for losses incurred by Portuguese citizens (Charter, 8 June 
1815). Thus, the maintenance of the slave trade began to be questioned strongly. 
                                                          
7 He assumed the title of Regent in 1799 and became D. João VI of Portugal in 1816. 
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Portugal reiterated its determination to abolish the slave trade gradually in the southern 
hemisphere too — on the grounds that slavery was repugnant to humanity and universal 
morality (Bethell, 1989). Although there was an opportunity to abandon slavery, that 
was insufficient to guarantee institutional transformation because policy makers were 
influenced by the ideology of slavery and by domestic political calculations and 
institutional positions (Cortell & Peterson, 1999). 
 
5.3 Self-reinforcing sequences: Accounting and taxation as reification mechanisms of 
African slavery 
The first charter levying taxes on slaves transported from Africa to Brazil (dated 10 
December 1647) required that taxes be paid only in the places of embarkation. Such 
taxes were deemed necessary by the Portuguese colonial powers to meet the public 
expenses of operating the Portuguese colonies in Angola, Guinea, and São Tome. It was 
considered fair that taxes on slaves should benefit the part of the Empire from where 
slaves were taken (Regulation 21 April 1649; Royal Letter, 9 August 1651). Ships 
carrying slaves from the Mine Coast (the present day countries of Ghana, Togo, Benin 
and Nigeria, and not part of the Portuguese Empire) paid taxes in São Tome. However, 
a Royal Letter of 1711 directed that the duties on slaves would henceforth be paid in 
Salvador, Bahia (a major Brazilian port and the capital of Brazil at the time). This 
avoided ships having to go to São Tome to pay tax and be delayed as a consequence. 
Instead, the duties were remitted from Brazil to São Tome in a compensation process. 
Later, this arrangement was extended to Rio de Janeiro and Pernambuco (Royal Letter, 
23 April 1716). Buyers and sellers began to see slaves as a taxable commodity, like any 
other good. Thus, government accounting and taxation helped to reify black African 
slaves as a commodity and to tax them commensurately. 
In 1714, a tax of 4500 réis was introduced on each slave transported internally from 
Pernambuco, Bahia and Rio de Janeiro to Minas Gerais (Fernandes, 2005). Thereby, 
government accounting and taxation procedures reinforced a policy of discouraging 
slaves from moving internally, from employment in agriculture to employment in 
mines. In November 1714, a Royal Letter considered the tax per slave was excessive 
and ordered a reduction. Henceforth, black African slaves were taxed more moderately. 
On 7 June 1724, King João V advised the Treasury of Bahia that a tax of 240 réis on 
slaves arriving in Minas Gerais was illegal and would increase the price of slaves. The 
King was committed to keeping the tax on slaves low. Thus, government accounting 
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and taxation changed in accord with the government’s programmatic ideas and 
discourse about the need to develop the economy of Brazil. Policy elites in a slave-
based society (slave owners) generated ideas which were communicated by political 
elites to the public. This provided symbolic meaning in the service of power. 
Government accounting and taxation dignified policy, legitimated it, and helped shape 
cognition by emphasising the State’s public commitment to develop agriculture and 
sugar industries in preference to the mining industry.  
Effective transmission of institutional meaning involved forging powerful and 
unforgettable impressions on the consciousness of individuals. Such transmission of 
meaning by text and images was based on social recognition that the institution 
(slavery) provided a permanent solution to a permanent collective problem (insufficient 
labour force). Potential institutional actors were acquainted systematically with these 
meanings, necessitating an ‘educational’ process. Depending on the relevance of a type 
of knowledge and its complexity and importance to a particular collective, that 
knowledge needed reaffirmation. This was done through the progressive introduction of 
new taxes on slavery, making taxation of slavery something regarded to be ‘natural’.   
The right to collect taxes was secured by a fee (usually determined at auction), 
payable to the Royal Treasury. Although the Crown had its own bureaucratic collection 
apparatus (clerks, treasurers and customs officers) it believed more tax revenue would 
be collected by private contractors than by bureaucrats (Madeira, 1993). These tax 
collection contracts with private individuals were interpretative schemes that helped 
legitimate slavery and communicate slavery. 8  
The codification of accounting rules and requirements was accompanied by an aura 
of precision and authority. This helped to embed and reify African slavery in Brazilian 
society. African slaves were regarded as ‘objects’ by receptors of accounting 
information: sellers, buyers and owners. They became more discernible as tradable 
objects because the commensurations of government accounting and taxation 
objectified and institutionalized slavery, depersonalized business relations, and created 
an interpretative framework that took slaves for granted as taxable commodities. That is, 
a transitory relation of domination was represented as if it was permanent, natural, and 
                                                          
8 The Portuguese colonial tax system engaged large merchants to collect taxes and rents owed to the 
Crown. For example, on 5 December 1751, Patrício Oliveira offered 505000 réis per year, commencing 
in January 1753, for three years, for the right to collect a fee of 800 réis for each slave landed at 
Pernambuco and Paraíba (Collecção da Legislação Portugueza, Legislação de 1750 a 1762). 
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atemporal. Once codified rules of government accounting were adopted, slavery gained 
temporal endurance. The commensurations (measurements) on which government 
accounting and taxation relied, simplified information and decontextualized knowledge 
(Espeland & Sauder, 2007). They supported the State’s ideology by creating an illusion 
that commodification was a natural occurrence.  
The act of imposing taxation controlled the movement of slaves into and within 
Brazil. Taxation endorsed the government’s view that slavery was the right thing to do. 
The social apprehension of slaves as commodities was regarded to be a manifestation of 
the King’s will and a fact of nature. 
In 1761, double-entry booking was prescribed for Portugal’s four General Control 
Offices (Letter of Law, 22 December 1761). In Lisbon, account books recorded taxes on 
slaves and consolidated revenues from the colonies. Several books recorded aspects of 
the administration and control of slavery in Brazil:  
 Book 9 recorded revenues from transporting slaves from Bahia to Minas Gerais 
and the fees of 3500 réis and 1000 réis for each imported slave landed in Bahia.  
 Book 20 recorded revenues from slaves sent from Pernambuco to Minas Gerais 
and the fees of 3500 réis and 1000 réis for each slave landed in Pernambuco.  
 Book 4 recorded tax revenues paid on slaves sent from Rio de Janeiro to Minas 
and the 800 réis fee for each slave landed in Rio de Janeiro.  
These account books were ‘cognitive devices that sort, order, and name’ (Carruthers & 
Espeland, 1991; p. 55). Government accounting rules were scripts, guidelines, 
templates, protocols or laws that provided meaning and established power. They helped 
to create belief that human life could be monetised objectively and taxed as a 
commodity. Thereby, government accounting rules reified the institution of slavery.  
In the 1760s, to centralize the collection of public money in Brazil, Collection 
Houses were created to receive taxes and Crown rents in each Captaincy. The 
prescribed single-entry bookkeeping system used a Book of Revenues and Expenses 
(Gomes, Carnegie, & Rodrigues, 2008). The accounting and taxation rules embodied in 
the recommended bookkeeping were interpretative schemes that communicated and 
legitimated slave trading.  
African slavery was reproduced stably over time. (reification through 
‘eternalization’). Thus, government accounting and taxation practices were implicated 
in reproducing social life, sanctioning particular interactions, clarifying social 
expectations and increasing the ‘financial visibility of people, events, and processes’ 
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(Englund & Gerdin, 2014; p. 169). They became recurrent. This helped to sustain the 
rectitude of importing slaves as commodities, and slave owners’ right to hold slaves. 
Tax collection practices changed little until the Portuguese Royal Court moved to 
Rio de Janeiro in 1808 (for an account of the re-location of the Royal Court, see Araújo, 
Rodrigues, & Craig, 2017). Although the contract system was inefficient, it provided an 
important ‘exchange currency’ (including of political patronage) for Brazilian 
politicians. This made its extinction difficult. 
In 1808, Prince João established a Royal Treasury in Rio de Janeiro to centralize 
(and better control) collection of public monies (Charter, 28 June). The cost of 
establishing the Portuguese court in Rio de Janeiro prompted a new transaction tax 
(siza) to fund the large public expenditures involved (Charter, 3 June 1809). This 
prompted to major changes in the fiscal system (Costa, 2005).  
The opening of Brazil’s ports to friendly nations in 1808 (Royal Letter, 28 January 
1808) was intended to encourage direct trade with Brazil and end requirements for all 
imported or exported products to pass through customs in Portugal (Rodrigues & 
Sangster, 2013). A 24% tax, payable at all customs offices in Brazil, was imposed on 
imports and exports. Previously, such taxes were paid to customs offices in Portugal. As 
well, sales of a wide variety of properties were subject to a 10% tax. A concessional 
(half) tax rate of 5% (meia siza) was applied to the selling price of slaves resident in 
Brazil (and thereby, acculturated to the Brazilian way of life). Thus, government 
accounting and taxation worked as an interpretative schema by considering slaves to be 
private property. Slaves were expected to be used in agriculture and mines to develop 
Brazil. Acculturated slaves could be bought and sold as domestic servants. The reduced 
tax rate was an incentive to use more acculturated slaves. 
Figure 2 shows an accounting document involved in the cognition and reification 
process: a receipt for the sale of a Creole slave (Ignacio) by Rivadavia Pereira de 
Alencar, issued in Rio de Janeiro on 7 August 1851. The receipt indicates that the seller 
sold the slave for 250000 réis and that the purchaser was obliged to pay the 
corresponding meia siza tax. 
--------------------------------- 
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
------------------------------- 
Figure 2 includes an image of a recurrent pattern of commercial activity from 
which meaningful structures emerge for the receptors of the document. The image at the 
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top can be conceived as part of the meaning process or ‘mental emulation’ (Grush, 
2004). It illustrates ‘perceptual symbols … [and]… simulators that combine with other 
processes to create conceptual meaning’ (Gärdenfors, 2007). Figure 2 emphasises the 
obligation of the purchaser, Antonio Alencar France, to pay the meia siza tax to the 
Crown. Any transaction on which payment of the siza tax was avoided, or which 
reported a value lower than the true price of goods traded, was considered null and void. 
In cases of non-compliance concerning transactions involving slaves, a monetary fine 
equal to the market value of the slave was payable – half to the informant and the other 
half to the Royal Crown (Berute, 2006; Rodrigues et al., 2015). Accounting devices 
helped to support slavery-related transactions. They reified the idea that black people 
were saleable commodities. Text devices and image schemas (such as in Figure 2) were 
carriers of meaning and signification. They reinforced slavery. The algebraic concepts 
and symbols used in the accounting and taxation of slaves had an object-like quality too 
(Sfard & Linchevski, 1994).  
The meia siza tax legitimated taxation of slavery as a way of financing the State. 
Although the tax rate was 50% lower, the overall objective was to generate revenues to 
cover significant public expenditures. Thereby, government accounting and taxation 
made the institution of slavery durable and difficult to alter. There was unification 
through alignment of the interests of the society with the interests of the State to 
embrace a collective identity. Government accounting and taxation were standardized. 
Symbolic forms were adapted to a standard framework which was promoted as the 
shared and acceptable basis of symbolic exchange (Thompson, 2013). The structural 
environment regarded African slaves as commodities and properties, and as legitimate 
instruments of fiscal policy. Slaves were important not only for the slave-based society 
and slave owners, but also for the State (legitimation through universalization). For 
example, in 1814, Decision 26 (5 September) imposed a tax of 4800 réis on each 
African slave who was disembarked in ports in southern Brazil. The intent was to 
finance the cost of the Royal police and public lighting in Rio de Janeiro. The social 
structures of slavery and taxation were aligned and mutually reinforcing.  
 
6. Competing logics and the second critical juncture: Opting for 
European immigration 
The second critical juncture was the decision in 1850 to adopt a policy of European 
immigration to develop Brazil (Figure 3). This decision was influenced strongly by the 
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external pressures Great Britain applied, from at least 1815, for Brazil to abolish the 
slave trade. Below we discuss how civil law was a reactive sequence to the slave trade 
and how accounting and taxation was a self-reinforcing sequence to the slave trade. 
---------------------------------- 
FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
----------------------------------- 
6.1 Civil law as a reactive sequence to the slave trade  
In 1815, the Prince Regent declared his determination to co-operate with Britain ‘in the 
cause of humanity and justice by adopting the most efficacious means for bringing 
about the gradual abolition of the slave trade’ (Charter, 15 June 28). He forbade 
Portuguese subjects from purchasing slaves ‘on any part of the Coast of Africa to the 
North of the Equator’ (p. 29). In 1816, D. João VI permitted Portuguese subjects to 
engage in the slave trade in African ports in the southern hemisphere where the 
Portuguese Crown had rights (Decision 11: 17 April). Thus, although the slave trade 
was illegal in the northern hemisphere, it remained legal in the southern hemisphere, 
and could continue to supply Brazil’s labour needs. Nonetheless, Portugal agreed with 
Great Britain to legislate to prohibit the slave trade and abolish it in the longer term. 
Thus, competing institutional logics appeared. These supported the slave trade and 
advocated its abolition. Nonetheless, after 1816, the slave trade grew (see Table 2).  
-------------------------------------- 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
-------------------------------------- 
On 8 November 1817, D. João VI pronounced that he and King George III of 
England wanted to prohibit the illicit trade in slaves; and on 26 January 1818, fines 
were established for illicit slave trading. Ideology began operating through 
fragmentation. There was a division and separation of groups. The dominant groups 
(State and slave owners) were challenged. Slavery was projected as evil, harmful or 
threatening. On 9 October 1819, D. João VI established a Mixed Commission (of 
Portuguese and British) to judge whether the slave trade complied with the various 
treaty obligations between Portugal and Great Britain.  
When the Portuguese court returned to Lisbon in 1821, Prince Pedro remained in 
Brazil, with wide powers to govern. The Metropolis of the Portuguese Empire reverted 
to Lisbon. Brazil was now a colony again. The Portuguese transferred the government 
institutions they had established in Rio de Janeiro after 1808 back to Lisbon (Bethell, 
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1989). On 1 August 1822, Prince Pedro accused the government in Lisbon of 
‘threatening slavery’ and freeing slaves ‘to arm themselves against their owners.’9 He 
knew such rhetoric would appeal to Brazilians because they recognized the importance 
of slavery. Many Brazilians agitated for independence. Prince Pedro proclaimed 
Brazil’s independence on 7 September 1822.10 He assumed the title of D. Pedro I of 
Brazil. 
In the early years of independence, the institutionalization of slavery permeated all 
levels of Brazilian society. In 1824, Decision 130 commanded that slaves be rented to 
fortify the capital (p. 92); and Decision 147 commanded that slaves be rented to crew 
warships (p. 102). Similar decisions ensured the durability of slavery by keeping slaves 
in Brazilian territory.11  
D. Pedro I’s reign (1822-1831) was weakened by the Cisplatina war,12 political fall-
out over his centralization of power, and his concessions to secure independence 
(Bethell, 1989). In 1827, he acceded to British demands to end the slave trade to Brazil 
before March 1830, pay £2 million compensation to Portugal, and continue a 
concessional 15 per cent maximum tariff on British imports to Brazil (Bethell, 1989). 
These concessions were viewed suspiciously. Many Brazilians thought their King was 
more interested in pursuing the throne of Portugal than defending Brazilian interests.  
On 3 May 1830, in his opening speech to the Brazilian General Assembly, D. Pedro 
I introduced a new institutional logic: that Brazil should discontinue the slave trade and 
facilitate the entry of European immigrants by making land available to them. 
 
… the Government is determined to employ all measures that claim good faith and humanity to 
prevent [the slave trade’s] continuation under any guise or form. I think that it is important to 
facilitate the entry into the country of manual laborers. Laws which authorize the distribution of 
waste lands, and which make adjustments with the settlers would be of obvious utility and advantage 
for our industry (p. 4). 
 
                                                          
9 http://www.camara.gov.br/Internet/InfDoc/conteudo/colecoes/Legislacao/Legimp-F_3.pdf; p. 125. 
 
10 However, provinces in the north, especially Bahia, resisted independence, unsuccessfully. In 1823, D. 
Pedro I freed slaves who had fought for Brazil against the Portuguese in Bahia (Decision 113; 13 July).  
 
11 For example, slaves were prohibited from leaving home without an identification card provided by their 
masters (Decree, 20 March 1829).  
 
12 This was an armed conflict in the 1820s between the United Provinces of the Río de la Plata and the 
Empire of Brazil over an area roughly encompassing present-day Uruguay. . 
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This new logic of population growth and economic development was ‘orchestrated by 
restive economic and social agents combine[d] with shifting external structures’ 
(Kirkpatrick, 2007; p. 331). 
Opposition to treaty obligations with Great Britain fomented the political crisis that 
preceded D. Pedro I’s abdication in April 1831 (Bethell, 1989). The high level of 
institutionalization and reification of slavery meant that acts (such as entering treaties 
with Great Britain) were resistant to attempts to change them (even by a powerful 
Emperor). The reification of slavery as a natural occurrence led to a lock-in (David, 
1985). Increasingly, slavery became systemic and beyond the control of individual 
actors. They were entrapped in the system’s dynamics (Sydow, Schreyögg, & Koch, 
2009).  
In April 1831, D. Pedro I’s five year old son, Pedro de Alcântara, was proclaimed 
Emperor D. Pedro II of Brazil. Because of his tender age, regents ruled Brazil until 
1840. In the Regency period, Vasconcelos, Minister of Finance, was a strong critic of 
the treaties with Great Britain. He espoused a different institutional logic. He blamed 
the 1827 Treaty (prohibiting the slave trade) for being a major cause of Brazil’s 
problems (Costa, 2005).  
The African slave trade in both hemispheres was declared illegal on 7 November 
1831 (by what we refer to as the ‘1831 Law’). Slave traders were encouraged to 
abandon their activities. During 1831, Decisions 10, 115 and 118 recommended stricter 
monitoring of the treaty abolishing the slave trade, condemned contraband trading in 
slaves, and despatched navy ships to guard Brazil’s coast to prevent the slave trade. 
These initiatives were ineffective because the 1831 Law was considered essentially ‘a 
law for the English to see.’13 Trafficking in slaves increased. Between 1836 and 1840, 
240,600 slaves disembarked in Brazil (see Table 2). This lends credence to the view that 
compliance or non-compliance with treaties is driven by forces within the State ─ the 
populace, the ruling elite, or other influential parties (Carmona, Donoso, & Walker, 
2010). The demands of powerful domestic pressure groups had proven more compelling 
than the requirements of Great Britain. Despite the 1831 Law and increased British 
naval pressure between 1830 and 1850, the slave trade continued openly in major 
                                                          
13 This saying is still used by Brazilians and Portuguese to express the idea that a law is not being 
complied with. 
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Brazilian ports, aided by corrupt public officials. Institutional change had not occurred. 
Indeed, it became easier for African slaves to be imported.  
An active ‘politics of slavery’ lobby led by Vasconcelos encouraged the Brazilian 
government to eliminate some stringent provisions of the 1831 Law (Parron, 2005). 
Political rhetoric at the time portrayed Brazilians as victims of the Brazilian-British 
Mixed Commission (see earlier). Broader cultural beliefs and rules determined that such 
portrayal was unacceptable; and that answers and solutions should accord with 
prevailing logics. Ideology operated by the mode of differentiation. This emphasized 
strategies of difference and division between individuals and groups (differentiation) 
and the construction of an enemy (expurgation of the other, Britain) (Thompson, 2013).  
The discourse against the 1831 Law sanctified the image of slave owners and 
accused Britain of interfering in national affairs. There was no compunction to highlight 
abuses of the 1831 Law or to strengthen it (Parron, 2005). Thus, the 1831 Law existed 
without affecting interaction orders. This decoupling lasted for about twenty years. 
Brazilian politicians were aware of the deep and fundamental impacts of slavery. Some 
hard-fought debates over slavery ensued. Nonetheless, slavery continued to be endorsed 
as an efficient remedy for on-going labour scarcity. In 1850, Brazil was assessed as 
‘dependent entirely on Negro labour – the commodity [could not] be substituted’ 
(Thomson, 1850; p. 68). 
De-institutionalization of African slavery did not occur. The slave trade continued 
to be socially desired, despite some anti-slave protests. Burlemaqui (1837; p. iii), for 
example, stated that his objective was ‘to show that the slave trade is hateful, refuting 
the fallacies used by its advocates.’ Burlemaqui cited a Society for the National Defence 
of Freedman Rights manuscript (published in Rio de Janeiro) which explained that slave 
labour could be replaced by free work if waste lands were distributed to settlers or 
machines were introduced in agriculture and mines. The manuscript used accounting 
numbers to explain that free work was more profitable than slave work, especially after 
considering the cost of slaves, their risk, low productivity and that the introduction of 
African slaves had had a bad influence on Brazilian society.  
The first decade of D. Pedro II’s reign (1840-1850) was marked by stability and the 
westward expansion of Brazil. The coffee and rubber industries grew considerably. 
There was little resistance in society or in parliament to the trafficking of slaves. 
However, international pressures, especially from Great Britain (which wanted Brazil to 
pass an effective law banning the slave trade) were again important. In 1849 and 1850, 
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the British navy intercepted slave-carrying ships in Brazilian waters, humiliating the 
Brazilian government and Emperor. In July 1850, Brazil acceded to Great Britain’s 
demands in exchange for a promise to suspend naval action (Conrad, 1984).  
In 1850, Law 581 sought to curb illegal trading in slaves and to promote European 
immigration as the best way to populate Brazil. This was something D. Pedro I had 
advocated twenty years before. Vessels found importing slaves could be sold, a reward 
given to informants, and illegally traded slaves returned to their homelands. The number 
of African slaves arriving in Brazil (about 380,000 in the previous decade) was reduced 
to 6,100 between 1851 and 1855 (see Table 21). The 1850 Law rendered slave trading 
difficult, expensive and increasingly unviable. Human and material resources (and not 
only rules) facilitated such action.  
After abolishing the trade in imported slaves in 1850, competing logics for and 
against the total abolition of slavery developed strongly. Debates in newspapers and 
parliament sometimes invoked accounting numbers to argue that free work was, and 
was not, more profitable than slave work.14 Abolition was considered risky because of 
fears that the high number of slaves in Brazil would allow them to dominate free 
people; and that the proprietary rights of slave owners might be ignored (Ottoni, 1871). 
Abolitionists argued that Brazil was a civilized Catholic country in which slavery 
should be regarded as inhumane, dangerous to the safety and welfare of Brazilian 
families, and less productive than free work (Furtado, 1883; Menezes, 1869).  
After 1850 the abolitionist movement became stronger and more determined. 
Institutional actors were more focused on achieving solutions consistent with the new 
prevailing logic. In this period, civil laws were reactive sequences to slavery. For 
example, in 1864, a decree forbade slavery in all public entities and prohibited 
foreigners and convents from owning slaves. In 1871, the Free Birth Law freed all new 
born children of slaves and slaves of the State or Crown. Owners of slaves were 
required to care for their slaves’ children until age 21, or surrender them to the State for 
monetary compensation. 
In 1888, during the absence of D. Pedro II in Europe, Princess Isabel, as Regent, 
abolished slavery by promulgating the Lei Aurea [literally ‘Golden Law’]. The princess 
                                                          
14 For an article favouring slave work that demonstrated the losses to Brazil if slavery was abolished, see 
Fundação Biblioteca Nacional, Periódicos 2,085,03,15 (1884). For an article using accounting numbers 
to argue that free work was more profitable than slave work, see Fundação da Biblioteca Nacional 
Periódicos, 2-049,04,03 (1887). 
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was aware that her action was highly risky. She believed that if the populace accepted 
abolition, she might become the Brazilian Empress (Chacon, 1989). Her action 
prompted a military coup d’état in 1889 and establishment of a republic.  
 
6.2 Accounting and taxation as a self-reinforcing sequence to the slave trade 
When Brazil declared independence in 1822, it faced a legacy of serious financial 
difficulties. The tax system had become more relaxed, tax collectors less diligent and 
the level of tax receipts lower. Although reliance on tax collection contractors 
continued, the Royal Treasury began to collect some taxes itself.15 In 1823, slaves 
arriving in Santos (province of São Paulo) from Mozambique were subject to a tax of 
4800 réis per capita (established by Decree in 1809), together with per capita customs 
duties of 1400 réis. Thus, reified practices and structures were reinforced through their 
everyday use. 
Although British pressures to abolish the slave trade disturbed the path dependency 
of the institution of slavery, only a few norms of taxation were affected. Brazil’s 
motives for resisting the abolition of slavery can be understood by the fact that, in the 
first half of 1823, 16% of national total revenues came from slave-related taxes and 
charges (Brasil, Ministério da Fazenda, 1823). 
Accounting systems supporting slavery were usually very simple, based on single-
entry accounting. This helped to convey meaning since this form of accounting could 
easily be understood by a broad cross-section of society (Ferguson, 2007). The 
accounting records used by the police in Rio de Janeiro, for example, evidence norms 
imposed by the State to provide interpretative schemes relating to slavery. They were 
unaffected by contradictory beliefs that introduced competing logics. On 25 August 
1825, the government established an Accounting and Treasury Plan for the General 
Intendancy of Police in Rio de Janeiro (Decision 185). This required that a record of 
revenue and expenses be kept. There were two revenue books related to slaves: Duties 
on Slaves and Bills of Correction. This form of accounting constituted slavery as an 
objective economic reality (Carruthers & Espeland, 1991) that could be represented and 
measured accurately in taxes and punishments. Procedures for entering records in the 
                                                          
15 For example, in 1823, Decision 104 stated that although Manoel Oliveira Lirio had been the contractor 
for siza and meia siza payments in the previous three years in parts of Rio de Janeiro, the Emperor 
commanded that such payments now be collected by the Royal Treasury. 
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book, Duties on Slaves, were codified (Decision 185, Article 8). Entries were required 
to ‘state the duties, the number of slaves and the ports where they go.’  
In 1834, major tax reforms separated the taxing powers of the national and 
provincial treasuries. The National Treasury assumed responsibility for collecting tariffs 
on imports and exports, and income from Rio de Janeiro. Responsibility for collecting 
the meia-siza tax on acculturated slaves was transferred to Provincial Treasuries (Costa, 
2005), where it remained until the abolition of slavery in 1888 (Fernandes, 2005).  
The 1831 Law and ensuing legislation abolishing the trade in slaves, deprived the 
State of significant tax revenue. For example, in 1832, the payment of duties on slaves 
arriving in Minas Gerais or southern ports was suspended (Decision 364). The ensuing 
decline in tax revenue prompted the introduction of a per capita tax of 2000 réis on 
slaves aged between 12 and 60 (Law 59, 1833). To facilitate replacement of the 
contracts system of tax collection with a more viable collection system, Brazil 
developed counting systems, records, censuses, registers, and maps showing the 
domicile of taxpayers. This was a reaction to the loss of revenues on imported slaves 
and reflected the need for a more efficient way of collecting tax.  
In 1833, to improve meia-siza collections, the Treasury required that slaves be 
registered (Resolution 191). Tax authorities argued that tax collectors were not obliged 
to detect illegal slave trading (Costa, 2005). This helped confer durability (Hasselbladh 
& Kallinikos, 2000) on the slave trade because tax authorities were unconcerned about 
whether they were taxing newly imported slaves or acculturated slaves. This evidences 
the capacity of government accounting and taxation processes to encourage high inertia 
and/or alignment with State ideology.  
In 1841, Law 243 mandated the public registration of all slaves. Slave owners 
resisted this strongly. Slaves were registered in specific books that were arranged 
according to the numerical order of homes. Slave owners were required to report the 
‘names, gender, color, age (known, or presumed), birthplace and job’ of their slaves (p. 
22). In 1842, Decree 151 regulated the collection of the levy on slaves held in cities and 
villages and meia-siza payments on transactions involving acculturated slaves. 
Registration of slaves was again considered mandatory for effective tax collection. 
Although there was widespread misrepresentation of newly imported slaves as 
acculturated slaves, registration helped tax authorities to collect meia-siza tax on all 
traded slaves (whether acculturated or not) and permitted slave owners to use slaves as 
collateral assets to obtain credit (for an example, see Rodrigues et al., 2015) 
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(dissimulation).16 This notion of ‘slaves as collateral’ is consistent with a pervading 
image of ‘slaves as property’. Many slave owners maintained a list of slaves they owned 
‘as if they were farm animals or real property’ (Fleischman et al., 2004; p. 56). Topik 
(1991; p.255) reported that plantation owners regarded slaves as property to be used 
collateral for bank loans and that ‘as late as 1888, 61 per cent of [Banco do Brasil’s] 
mortgages were secured by slaves’ (see Rodrigues et al., 2015). 
At a time when the law provided reactive sequences to slavery, government 
accounting and taxation promoted structural inertia and self-reinforcing sequences. The 
benefits of reifying slavery were obvious to the State. The collection of taxes on slaves 
increased substantially after the 1841 Law (Costa, 2005). 
In 1860, Decree 2699 changed the way meia-siza tax was collected in Rio de 
Janeiro. A payment of 40000 réis was required for each slave sold, exchanged, 
transferred, gifted, auctioned, or delivered for payment of debt. Thus, the amount of tax 
collected no longer depended on a slave’s value. A deed was required if the value of the 
transaction exceeded 200000 réis. If the value was less, interested parties and two 
witnesses were required to sign the deed; and the buyer was given a month to pay the 
tax or the transaction would be invalidated. Thus, government accounting and taxation 
continued to sanction slavery, albeit in a more restricted fashion. 
The meia-siza tax was charged continuously from 1809 to 1888. After 1850, in Rio 
Grande do Sul, other taxes on slavery were imposed to supplement the meia-siza tax to 
raise revenue to support immigration from Europe (Costa, 2005). In 1871, the annual 
tax on each slave, imposed by the Free Birth Law, was calculated on slaves registered 
by slave owners. Slaves not registered within one year were to be considered free. Taxes 
collected on the transfer of ownership of slaves (meia-siza) and fines for non-
compliance were used to compensate slave owners. The number of slaves emancipated 
in each province depended on the compensation funds available. The distributions 
accorded with the proportion of slaves living in each province (Santos, 2009). A 
progressive increase from 1882 in the annual tax rate on each slave increased the 
compensation fund (Furtado, 1883).  
In the decades following the Free Birth Law in 1871, government accounting and 
taxation processes provided symbolic meanings that were implicated in interpreting a 
                                                          
16 In most provinces other than Rio Grande do Sul, registration was resisted. In Grão Pará, Maranhão, 
Bahia and Espírito Santo, the meia-siza was not collected, but was replaced by a tax on slaves who left 
the province.  
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changing reality in Brazil. They began to be involved in de-reifying slavery. 
Government accounting and taxation reflected the general mood of Brazilian society by 
becoming less effective in reinforcing the institution of slavery. Increasingly, 
government accounting and taxation texts provided symbolic meanings related to 
abolition by using taxation to raise revenue in support of immigration and emancipation.  
  
7. Discussion 
By combining historical institutionalism, institutional logics and ideology, we 
promote better understanding of the path transformation of Brazilian slavery. Archival 
sources reveal that the institution of slavery evolved through competing logics. These 
were constructed and conveyed by a variety of symbolic forms that ranged from 
everyday linguistic statements, to more complex texts and images.  
Government accounting and taxation were a part of a dense network of ties that 
reinforced institutions and rendered social systems more stable and coherent (Clemens 
& Cook, 1999). Brazil became increasingly dependent on fiscal revenues generated by 
taxes on slaves and trading in slaves. This encouraged a structural inertia that impeded 
the de-reification and abolition of slavery, despite international pressures and changing 
institutional logics. Thus, at a time when civil laws were reactive sequences, 
government accounting and taxation were self-reinforcing sequences. Over a long 
period of time, government accounting and taxation provided symbolic meaning in the 
service of power. It helped the dominant ideology by providing symbolic meaning 
through portraying slavery as permanent, unchanging and ever-recurring (reification). 
Analysis of the particular discourses of government accounting and taxation helps in 
understanding the symbolic meaning used by actors to make sense of (and give meaning 
to) a context. Commonly, as here, interaction between agents and socially-produced 
structures occurred through recursive practices that were part of daily routines.  
As a social practice, government accounting and taxation influenced society by 
providing meaning to events and processes of slavery (e.g., by taxing slaves as 
commodities). Accounting helped to reinforce slavery as something that was natural. 
Communication using accounting and taxation artefacts (e.g., the numbers in 
government accounts) was symbolically salient and engendered perceptions of accuracy 
and objectivity (Carruthers & Espeland, 1991). Such artefacts helped to comprehend 
slavery not as a human product, but as a fact of nature or manifestation of the King’s 
wishes. So, accounting influenced slavery by reifying institutions and institutionalizing 
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meaning. In return, it was influenced by the slave-based society. Accounting helped to 
effect change that accorded with the programmatic ideas of politicians by providing 
meanings that influenced the receptors of messages (Ferguson, 2007).  
Because government accounting and taxation rules provided meanings in numerical 
terms to objectify reality, they were part of the State’s rhetorical legitimation of slavery. 
They rendered parts of the extant social and organisational world calculable. 
Government accounting and taxation created order out of ‘organized anarchy’ 
(Carruthers, 1995; p. 321), objectified facets of organizational life, and constructed 
rationalized and transportable beliefs. These were important features of reification and 
institutionalization. Government accounting and tax rules helped to objectify values 
enacted by the State and the King, thereby making those values appear irrefutable 
(Bourguignon, 2005).  
Slavery was aligned with a social order that protected slave owners. Governments 
were motivated strongly to develop and populate Brazil. In such a setting, 
commensurations, values and symbols provided by government accounting and taxation 
helped to highlight the benefits of slavery. Accounting-based commensurations led to 
the gradual reification of slavery in a ‘drawn out process of continual deepening and 
broadening of understanding until … the concept as an object’ could be accepted 
(Krussell, 1995; pp. 342-343). Accounting and taxation were products of society and 
were implicated actively in constituting that society. 
Institutional changes occurred in response to changes in the meanings and discourse 
of institutional actors. These changes and their associated ideas developed into 
institutional logics that were reified because of their ‘ideal character’ (Bourguignon, 
2005; p. 361). Changes in rules did not signal an immediate change in practices. This is 
unsurprising because when institutions endure and ‘lock in’, change in political 
institutions can take several decades. It was only when heterogeneity was high and 
social networks were fragmented, that institutional change occurred (Clemens & Cook, 
1999). At the first critical juncture, the fragmentation of domestic social networks was 
sufficient to make institutional change happen. At the second critical juncture, the low 
level of social fragmentation increased the relative importance of exogenous shock as a 
source of change (British pressure) 
When a significant practice (such as slavery) becomes locked in, latent inefficiency 
becomes manifest. When confronted with change requirements, the social system in 
Brazil struggled to adopt new measures. It preferred to be confined to the existing path 
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of action and historical solutions (Sydow et al., 2009). This was the case in 1830 when 
D. Pedro I proposed a new path (European immigration) for Brazil’s development. At 
the time, the social system was confined to the existing path of slavery. Although rules 
changed, the social system was bound to the historical solution.  
The historical analysis we have conducted of role of accounting in institutionalizing 
slavery in Brazil demonstrates the political and value-laden nature of accounting. Our 
analysis reveals how government accounting and taxation institutionalized government 
administration of slavery by according it social authority, social reality, and temporal 
endurance. Such an understanding offers insights into how accounting in contemporary 
societies can sustain new forms of moral atrocities (including modern forms of slavery, 
genocide, war, and the subjugation of peoples by dictators). Historical analysis also 
offers an opportunity to critically examine how accounting can be conversely used to 
deinstitutionalize such dominant and subjugating logics and institutionalize empowering 
ones. 
Further research could be directed beneficially to seek enhanced understanding of 
how institutional path dependence or path transformation is influenced by institutional 
logics and ideology; and how reification provided by government accounting and 
taxation can prompt resistance to a new institutional logic. Other settings could also be 
explored to develop fine-grained understandings of the capacity for the de-reification of 
institutions to be retarded by structural inertia arising from embedding government 
accounting and taxation in a nation’s institutional, legal and regulatory framework. 
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Table 1: Main Sources of Evidence 
 
Aspects studied Main sources 
 
First critical juncture: 
 
Civil Law 
 
 
 
Government accounting and taxation 
 
Previous literature on Brazilian slavery 
Portuguese and Brazilian legislation on slavery (all legislation 
is online at Collecção da Legislação Portugueza and Digital 
Library of the Chamber of Deputies) 
 
Portuguese and Brazilian government accounting and taxation 
legislation (available in the online Digital Library of the 
Chamber of Deputies)  
 
Second critical juncture: 
 
Civil Law 
 
 
 
 
Government accounting and taxation  
 
Brazilian legislation on slavery available online through the 
Digital Library of the Chamber of Deputies  
Old books on slavery accessed at the British Library, Brasiliana 
Library, Senate of Brazil Digital Library 
Old newspapers and commercial documents accessed at 
National Library Foundation of Brazil 
Brazilian legislation on government accounting and taxation 
Government accounting and taxation documents available 
online at the Digital Library of the Chamber of Deputies. 
 
 
  
 Table 2: African Slaves Disembarked in Brazil, 1531 to 1855 
1531-1575 until 1771-1780 
Period Number 
1531-1575 10000 
1576-1600 40000 
1601-1625 100000 
1626-1650 100000 
1651-1670 185000 
1676-1700 175000 
1701-1710 153700 
1711-1720 139000 
1721-1730 146300 
1731-1740 166100 
1741-1750 185100 
1751-1760 169400 
1761-1770 164600 
1771-1780 161300 
Total 1895500 
 
1781-1785 until 1851-1855 
Period Number 
1781-1785 63100 
1786-1790 97800 
1791-1795 125000 
1796-1800 108700 
1801-1805 117900 
1806-1810 123500 
1811-1815 139400 
1816-1820 188300 
1821-1825 181200 
1826-1830 250200 
1831-1835 93700 
1836-1840 240600 
1841-1845 120900 
1846-1850 157500 
1851-1855 6100 
Total 2113900 
 
Source: IBGE (2000) 
 
  
 Figure 1: First Critical Juncture: African Slavery  
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Source: Adapted from Mahoney (2000, p. 514). 
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African slavery 
… 
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(Initial conditions) 
Two options are 
available (conflicting 
logics)  
Time 2 
(Critical juncture)  
African slavery is favored over 
Indigenous native slavery  
This is a contingent event 
 
Time 3+ 
(Self-reinforcement)  
African slavery capitalizes on the 
initial advantage and is stably 
reproduced over time 
Reification process develops 
Government accounting 
and taxation rules on 
black slavery appeared: 
slaves were reified as 
objects 
Tax rules on slavery increased 
More words, numbers and signs of 
slavery strengthened the reification 
process: black slaves were regarded 
to be objects and commodities 
 
 
Reification process develops 
 
Figure 2: Slave Sales Receipt Emphasising Buyer’s Liability to Pay Meia Siza Tax 
 
Source: Fundação Biblioteca Nacional 
http://consorcio.bn.br/MidiView/MidiView.asp?url=/slave_trade/manuscritos/mssI1_19_31.j
pg, accessed 9 April 2012. 
Translation: I, the undersigned, declare that, having sold to Mr. António Franco Alencar, a 
brown slave whose name is Ignacio from the nation ... Creole, with all the vices and ailments, 
new and old, as I possessed him, for the sum of two hundred and fifty thousand réis, which I 
received in the course of the sale, in cash, free and cleared of liens and mortgages, obliging 
me to make good the sale forever, and the said António Franco Alencar is obliged to pay the 
siza. 
Rio de Janeiro 1 August 1851 
Signature of the seller 
Note: italic font was applied to hand written text. 
Figure 3: Second Critical Juncture: European Immigration and Abolition of the Slave 
Trade and Slavery 
 
European Immigration  
African slave trade 
        
 
      
   r    
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Mahoney (2000, p.514) 
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Time 2 
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This is a contingent event 
 
Time 3+ 
(Self-reinforcement)  
European immigration capitalises 
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European Immigration 
European Immigration 
… 
Government accounting 
and tax rules on black 
slavery are kept 
Taxation on the slave trade and 
slavery was maintained: Structural 
inertia  
 
De-reification process begins 
Taxation revenues on slavery was 
used to favor European 
immigration, helping the de-
reification process  
